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Abstract
Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic for many
applications. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot
express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which he is unaware without
there being an explicit fact that the agent knows he is unaware of. We propose a logic
for reasoning about knowledge of unawareness, by extending Fagin and Halpern’s Logic
of General Awareness. The logic allows quantification over variables, so that there is a
formula in the language that can express the fact that “an agent explicitly knows that there
exists a fact of which he is unaware”. Moreover, that formula can be true without the agent
explicitly knowing that he is unaware of any particular formula. We provide a sound and
complete axiomatization of the logic, using standard axioms from the literature to capture
the quantification operator. Finally, we show that the validity problem for the logic is
recursively enumerable, but not decidable.
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1 Introduction
As is well known, standard models of epistemic logic suffer from the logical omniscience prob-
lem (first observed and named by Hintikka [1962]): agents know all tautologies and all the log-
ical consequences of their knowledge. This seems inappropriate for resource-bounded agents
and agents who are unaware of various concepts (and thus do not know logical tautologies
involving those concepts). Many approaches to avoiding this problem have been suggested.
One of the best-known is due to Fagin and Halpern [1988] (FH from now on). It involves
distinguishing explicit knowledge from implicit knowledge, using a syntactic awareness opera-
tor. Roughly speaking, implicit knowledge is the standard (S5) notion of knowledge; explicit
knowledge amounts to implicit knowledge and awareness.
Since this approach was first introduced by FH, there has been a stream of papers on
awareness in the economics literature (see, for example, [Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini 1998;
Halpern 2001; Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2003; Modica and Rustichini 1994; Modica and
Rustichini 1999]). The logics used in these papers cannot express the fact that an agent may
(explicitly) know that he is unaware of some facts. Indeed, in the language of [Halpern 2001],
all of these models are special cases of the original awareness model where awareness is gen-
erated by primitive propositions, that is, an agent is aware of a formula iff the agent is aware
of all primitive propositions that appear in the formula. If awareness is generated by primitive
propositions, then it is impossible for an agent to know that he is unaware of a specific fact.
Nevertheless, knowledge of unawareness comes up often in real-life situations. For ex-
ample, when a primary physician sends a patient to an expert on oncology, he knows that an
oncologist is aware of things that could help the patient’s treatment of which he is not aware.
Moreover, the physician is unlikely to know which specific thing he is unaware of that would
improve the patient’s condition (if he knew which one it was, he would not be unaware of it!).
Similarly, when an investor decides to let his money be managed by an investment fund com-
pany, he knows the company is aware of more issues involving the financial market than he is
(and is thus likely to get better results with his money), but again, the investor is unlikely to be
aware of the specific relevant issues. Ghirardato [2001] pointed out the importance of dealing
with unawareness and knowledge of unawareness in the context of decision-making, but did
not give a formal model.
To model knowledge of unawareness, we extend the syntax of the logic of general aware-
ness considered by FH to allow for quantification over variables. Thus, we allow formulas
such as Xi(∃x¬Aix), which says that agent i (explicitly) knows that there exists a formula of
which he is not aware. The idea of adding propositional quantification to modal logic is well
known in the literature (see, for example, [Bull 1969; Engelhardt, Meyden, and Moses 1998;
Fine 1970; Kaplan 1970; Kripke 1959]). However, as we explain in Section 3, because Ai is
a syntactic operator, we are forced to give somewhat nonstandard semantics to the existential
operator. Nevertheless, we are able to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the
resulting logic, using standard axioms from the literature to capture the quantification opera-
tor. Using the logic, we can easily characterize the knowledge of the relevant agents in all the
examples we consider.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the standard semantics
for knowledge and awareness. In Section 3, we introduce our logic for reasoning about knowl-
edge of unawareness. In Section 4 we axiomatize the logic, and in Section 5, we consider the
complexity of the decision problem for the logic. We conclude in Section 6.
2 The FH model
We briefly review the FH Logic of General Awareness here, before generalizing it to allow
quantification over propositional variables. The syntax of the logic is as follows: given a set
{1, . . . , n} of agents, formulas are formed by starting with a set Φ = {p, q, . . .} of primitive
propositions, and then closing off under conjunction (∧), negation (¬), and the modal operators
Ki, Ai, Xi, i = 1, . . . , n. Call the resulting language LK,X,An (Φ). As usual, we define ϕ∨ψ and
ϕ⇒ ψ as abbreviations of ¬(¬ϕ ∧¬ψ) and ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, respectively. The intended interpretation
ofAiϕ is “i is aware of ϕ”. The power of this approach comes from the flexibility of the notion
of awareness. For example, “agent i is aware of ϕ” may be interpreted as “agent i is familiar
with all primitive propositions in ϕ” or as “agent i can compute the truth value of ϕ in time t”.
Having awareness in the language allows us to distinguish two notions of knowledge: im-
plicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. Implicit knowledge, denoted by Ki, is defined as
truth in all states that the agent considers possible, as usual. Explicit knowledge, denoted by
Xi, is defined as the conjunction of implicit knowledge and awareness.
We give semantics to formulas in LK,X,An (Φ) in awareness structures. A tuple M =
(S, pi,K1, ...,Kn,A1, . . . ,An) is an awareness structure for n agents (over Φ) if S is a set
of states, pi : S × Φ → {true, false} is an interpretation that determines which primitive
propositions are true at each state, Ki is a binary relation on S for each agent i = 1, . . . , n, and
Ai is a function associating a set of formulas with each state in S, for i = 1, ..., n. Intuitively, if
(s, t) ∈ Ki, then agent i considers state t possible at state s, while Ai(s) is the set of formulas
that agent i is aware of at state s. The set of formulas the agent is aware of can be arbitrary.
Depending on the interpretation of awareness one has in mind, certain restrictions on Ai may
apply. (We discuss some interesting restrictions in the next section.)
LetMn(Φ) denote the class of all awareness structures for n agents over Φ, with no restric-
tions on the Ki relations and on the functionsAi. We use the superscripts r, e, and t to indicate
that the Ki relations are restricted to being reflexive, Euclidean,1 and transitive, respectively.
Thus, for example, Mrtn (Φ) is the class of all reflexive and transitive awareness structures for
n agents.
We write (M, s) |= ϕ if ϕ is true at state s in the awareness structure M . The truth relation
is defined inductively as follows:
(M, s) |= p, for p ∈ Φ, if pi(s, p) = true
(M, s) |= ¬ϕ if (M, s) 6|= ϕ
(M, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ
1Recall that a binary relation Ki is Euclidean if (s, t), (s, u) ∈ Ki implies that (t, u) ∈ Ki.
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(M, s) |= Kiϕ if (M, t) |= ϕ
for all t such that (s, t) ∈ Ki
(M, s) |= Aiϕ if ϕ ∈ Ai(s)
(M, s) |= Xiϕ if (M, s) |= Aiϕ and (M, s) |= Kiϕ.
A formula ϕ is said to be valid in awareness structure M , written M |= ϕ, if (M, s) |= ϕ
for all s ∈ S. A formula is valid in a class N of awareness structures, written N |= ϕ, if it is
valid for all awareness structures in N , that is, if N |= ϕ for all N ∈ N .
Consider the following set of well-known axioms and inference rules:
Prop. All substitution instances of valid formulas of propositional logic.
K. (Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Kiψ.
T. Kiϕ⇒ ϕ.
4. Kiϕ⇒ KiKiϕ.
5. ¬Kiϕ⇒ Ki¬Kiϕ.
A0. Xiϕ⇔ Kiϕ ∧Aiϕ.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ (modus ponens).
GenK . From ϕ infer Kiϕ.
It is well known that the axioms T, 4, and 5 correspond to the requirements that the Ki
relations are reflexive, transitive, and Euclidean, respectively. Let Kn be the axiom system
consisting of the axioms Prop, K and rules MP, and GenK . The following result is well known
(see, for example, [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] for proofs).
Theorem 2.1: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of {T, 4, 5} and let C be the corresponding
subset of {r, t, e}. Then Kn∪{A0}∪C is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language
LK,X,An (Φ) with respect to MCn (Φ).
3 A logic for reasoning about knowledge of unawareness
To allow reasoning about knowledge of unawareness, we extend the language LK,X,An (Φ) by
adding a countable set of propositional variables X = {x, y, z, . . .} and allowing universal
quantification over these variables. Thus, if ϕ is a formula, then so is ∀xϕ. As usual, we take
∃xϕ to be an abbreviation for ¬∀x¬ϕ. Let L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) denote this extended language.
We assume that X is countably infinite for essentially the same reason that the set of vari-
ables is always taken to be infinite in first-order logic. Without it, we seriously limit the expres-
sive power of the language. For example, a formula such as ∃x∃y(¬(x⇔ y)∧A1x∧A1y) says
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that there are two distinct formulas that agent 1 is aware of. We can similarly define formulas
saying that there are k distinct formulas that agent 1 is aware of. However, to do this we need
k distinct primitive propositions.
Essentially as in first-order logic, we can define inductively what it means for a variable x
to be free in a formula ϕ. If ϕ does not contain the universal operator ∀, then every occurrence
of x in ϕ is free; an occurrence of x is free in ¬ϕ (or Kiϕ, Xiϕ, Aiϕ) iff the corresponding oc-
currence of x is free in ϕ; an occurrence of x in ϕ1∧ϕ2 is free iff the corresponding occurrence
of x in ϕ1 or ϕ2 is free; and an occurrence of x is free in ∀yϕ iff the corresponding occurrence
of x is free in ϕ and x is different from y. Intuitively, an occurrence of a variable is free in a
formula if it is not bound by a quantifier. A formula that contains no free variables is called a
sentence.
Let S∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) denote the set of sentences in L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ). If ψ is a formula, let
ϕ[x/ψ] denote the formula that results by replacing all free occurrences of the variable x in ϕ
by ψ. (If there is no free occurrence of x in ϕ, then ϕ[x/ψ] = ϕ.) We extend this notion of
substitution to sequences of variables, writing ϕ[x1/ψ1, . . . , xn/ψn]. We say that ψ is substi-
tutable for x in ϕ if, for all propositional variables y, if an occurrence of y is free in ψ, then the
corresponding occurrence of y is free in ϕ[x/ψ].
We want to give semantics to formulas in L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) in awareness structures (where
now we allow Ai(s) to be an arbitrary subset of S∀,K,X,An (Φ,X )). The standard approach
for giving semantics to propositional quantification ([Engelhardt, Meyden, and Moses 1998;
Kripke 1959; Bull 1969; Kaplan 1970; Fine 1970]) uses semantic valuations, much like in
first-order logic. A semantic valuation V associates with each propositional variable and state
a truth value, just as an interpretation pi associates with each primitive proposition and state a
truth value. Then (M, s,V) |= x if V(x) = true and (M, s,V) |= ∀xϕ if (M, s,V ′) |= ϕ for all
valuations V ′ that agree with V on all propositional variables other than x.2 We write V ∼x V ′
if V(y) = V ′(y) for all variables y 6= x.
Using semantic valuations does not work in the presence of awareness. If Ai(s) consists
only of sentences, then a formula such as ∀xAix is guaranteed to be false since, no matter what
the valuation is, x /∈ Ai(s). The valuation plays no role in determining the truth of a formulas
of the form Aiψ. On the other hand, if we allow Ai(s) to include any formula in the language,
then (M, s,V) |= ∀xAi(x) iff x ∈ Ai(s). But then it is easy to check that (M, s,V) |= ∃xAi(x)
iff x ∈ Ai(s), which certainly does not seem to capture our intuition.
We want to interpret ∀xAi(x) as saying “for all sentences ϕ ∈ S∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ), Ai(ϕ)
holds”. For technical reasons (which we explain shortly), we instead interpret this it as “for
all formulas ϕ ∈ LK,X,An (Φ), Ai(ϕ) holds”. That is, we consider only sentences with no
quantification. To achieve this, we use syntactic valuations, rather than semantic valuations.
A syntactic valuation is a function V : X → LK,X,An (Φ), which assigns to each variable a
sentence in LK,X,An (Φ).
2We remark that the standard approach does not use separate propositional variables, but quantifies over prim-
itive propositions. This makes it unnecessary to use valuations. It is easy to see that the definition we have given
is equivalent to the standard definition. Using propositional variables is more convenient in our extension.
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We give semantics to formulas in L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) by by induction on the total number of
free and bound variables, with a subinduction on the length of the formula. The definitions for
the constructs that already appear in LK,X,An (Φ) are the same. To deal with universal quantifi-
cation, we just consider all possible replacements of the quantified variable by a sentence in
LK,X,An (Φ).
• If ϕ is a formula whose free variables are x1, . . . , xk, then (M, s,V) |= ϕ if (M, s,V) |=
ϕ[x1/V(x1), . . . , xk/V(xk)]
• (M, s,V) |= ∀xϕ if (M, s,V ′) |= ϕ for all syntactic valuations V ′ ∼x V .
Note that although ϕ[x1/V(x1), . . . ,V(xk)] may be a longer formula than ϕ, it involves fewer
variables, since V(x1), . . . ,V(xk) do not mention variables. This is why it is important that
we quantify only over sentences in LK,X,An (Φ); if we were to quantify over all sentences in
S∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ), then the semantics would not be well defined. For example, to determine
the truth of ∀xx, we would have to determine the truth of x[x/∀xx] = ∀xx. This circularity
would make |= undefined. In any case, given our restrictions, it is easy to show that |= is well
defined. Since the truth of a sentence is independent of a valuation, for a sentence ϕ, we write
(M, s) |= ϕ rather than (M, s, V ) |= ϕ.
Under our semantics, the formula Ki(∃x(Ajx ∧ ¬Aix)) is consistent and that it can be
true at state s even though there might be no formula ψ in LK,X,An (Φ) such that Ki((Ajψ ∧
¬Aiψ)). This situation can happen if, at all states agent i considers possible, agent j is aware
of something agent i is not, but there is no one formula ψ such that agent j is aware of ψ
in all states agent i considers possible and agent i is not aware of ψ in all such states. By
way of contrast, if ∃xKi(Ajx ∧ ¬Aix) is true at state s, then there is a formula ψ such that
Ki(Ajψ∧¬Aiψ) holds at s. The difference betweenKi∃x(Ajx∧¬Aix) and ∃xKi(Ajx∧¬Aix)
is essentially the same as the difference between ∃xKiϕ andKi(∃xϕ) in first-order modal logic
(see, for example, [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] for a discussion).
The next example illustrates how the logic of knowledge of awareness can be used to cap-
ture some interesting situations.
Example 3.1: Consider an investor (agent 1) and an investment fund broker (agent 2). Sup-
pose that we have two facts that are relevant for describing the situation: the NASDAQ index
is more likely to increase than to decrease tomorrow (p), and Amazon will announce a huge
increase in earnings tomorrow (q). Let S = {s}, pi(s, p) = pi(s, q) = true, Ki = {(s, s)},
A1(s) = {p, ∃x(A2x ∧ ¬A1x)}, and A2(s) = {p, q, A2q,¬A1q, A2q ∧ ¬A1q}. Thus, both
agents explicitly know that the NASDAQ index is more likely to increase than to decrease to-
morrow. However, the broker also explicitly knows that Amazon will announce a huge increase
in earnings tomorrow. Furthermore, the broker explicitly knows that he (broker) is aware of
this fact and the investor is not. On the other hand, the investor explicitly knows that there is
something that the broker is aware of but he is not. That is,
(M, s,V) |= X1p ∧X2p ∧X2q ∧ ¬X1q
∧X2(A2q ∧ ¬A1q) ∧X1(∃x(A2x ∧ ¬A1x)).
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Since X2(A2q ∧ ¬A1q) implies ∃xX2(A2x ∧ ¬A1x), there is some formula x such that the
broker knows that the investor is unaware of x although he is aware of x. However, since
(M, s,V) |= ¬A2(∃x(A2x ∧ ¬A1x)), it follows that (M, s,V) |= ¬X2(∃x(A2x ∧ ¬A1x)).
It may seem unreasonable that, in Example 3.1, the broker is aware of the formula A2q ∧
¬A1q, without being aware of ∃x(A2x ∧ ¬A1x). Of course, if the broker were aware of this
formula, thenX2((∃x(A2x∧¬A1x)) would hold at state s. This example suggests that we may
want to require various properties of awareness. Here are some that are relevant in this context:
• Awareness is closed under existential quantification if ϕ ∈ Ai(s), ϕ = ϕ′[x/ψ] and
ψ ∈ LK,X,An (Φ), then (∃xϕ′) ∈ Ai(s).
• Awareness is generated by primitive propositions if, for all agents i, ϕ ∈ Ai(s) iff all the
primitive propositions that appear in ϕ are in Ai(s) ∩ Φ. That is, an agent is aware of ϕ
iff she is aware of all the primitive propositions that appear in ϕ.
• Agents know what they are aware of if, for all agents i and all states s, t such that (s, t) ∈
Ki we have that Ai(s) = Ai(t).
Closure under existential quantification does not hold in Example 3.1. It is easy to see
that it is a consequence of awareness being generated by primitive propositions. As shown
by Halpern [2001] and Halpern and Reˆgo [2005], a number of standard models of awareness
in the economics literature (e.g., [Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper 2003; Modica and Rustichini
1999]) can be viewed as instances of the FH model where awareness is taken to be generated by
primitive propositions and agents know what they are aware of. While assuming that awareness
is generated by primitive propositions seems like quite a reasonable assumption if there is no
existential quantification in the language, it does not seem quite so reasonable in the presence
of quantification. For example, if awareness is generated by primitive propositions, then the
formula Ai(∃x¬Aix) is valid, which does not seem to be reasonable in many applications. For
some applications it may be more reasonable to instead assume only that awareness is weakly
generated by primitive propositions. This is the case if, for all states s and agents i,
• ¬ϕ ∈ Ai(s) iff ϕ ∈ Ai(s);
• ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ Ai(s) iff ϕ, ψ ∈ Ai(s);
• Kiϕ ∈ Ai(s) iff ϕ ∈ Ai(s);
• Aiϕ ∈ Ai(s) iff ϕ ∈ Ai(s);
• Xiϕ ∈ Ai(s) iff ϕ ∈ Ai(s);
• if ∀xϕ ∈ Ai(s), then p ∈ Ai(s) for each primitive proposition p that appears in ∀xϕ;
• if ϕ[x/ψ] ∈ Ai(s) for some formula ψ ∈ LK,X,An (Φ), then ∃xϕ ∈ Ai(s).
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If the language does not have quantification, then awareness is weakly generated by primitive
propositions iff it is generated by primitive propositions. However, with quantification in the
language, while it is still true that if awareness is generated by primitive propositions then it
is weakly generated by primitive propositions, the converse does not necessarily hold. For ex-
ample, if A1(s) = ∅ for all s, then awareness is weakly generated by primitive propositions.
Intuitively, not being aware of any formulas is consistent with awareness being weakly gen-
erated by primitive propositions. However, if agent 1’s awareness is generated by primitive
propositions, then, for example, ∃xAjx must be in A1(s) for all s and all agents j.
4 Axiomatization
In this section, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic described in the
previous section. We show that, despite the fact that we have a different language and used a
different semantics for quantification, essentially the same axioms characterize our definition
of quantification as those that have been shown to characterize the more traditional definition.
Indeed, our axiomatization is very similar to the multi-agent version of an axiomatization given
by Fine [1970] for a variant of his logic where the range of quantification is restricted.
Consider the following axioms for quantification:
1∀. ∀xϕ⇒ ϕ[x/ψ] if ψ is a quantifier-free formula substitutable for x in ϕ.
K∀. ∀x(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ (∀xϕ⇒ ∀xψ).
N∀. ϕ⇒ ∀xϕ if x is not free in ϕ.
Barcan. ∀xKiϕ⇒ Ki∀xϕ.
Gen∀. From ϕ infer ∀xϕ.
These axioms are almost identical to the ones considered by Fine [1970], except that we
restrict 1∀ to quantifier-free formulas; Fine allows arbitrary formulas to be substituted (provided
that they are substitutable for x). K∀ and Gen∀ are analogues to the axiom K and rule of
inference GenK in Kn. The Barcan axiom, which is well-known in first-order modal logic,
captures the relationship between quantification and Ki.
Let K∀n be the axiom system consisting of the axioms in Kn together with {A0, 1∀, K∀, N∀,
Barcan, Gen∀}.
Theorem 4.1: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of {T, 4, 5} and let C be the corresponding
subset of {r, t, e}. IfΦ is countably infinite, then K∀n∪C is a sound and complete axiomatization
of the language L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) with respect to M∀,Cn (Φ,X ).3
3We remark that Prior [1956] showed that, in the context of first-order modal logic, the Barcan axiom is not
needed in the presence of the axioms of S5 (that is T , 4, and 5). The same argument works here.
8
Proof: Showing that a provable formula ϕ is valid can be done by a straightforward induction
on the length of the proof of ϕ, using the fact that all axioms are valid in the appropriate set of
models and all inference rules preserve validity.
In the standard completeness proof for modal logic, a canonical model M c is constructed
where the states are maximal consistent sets of formulas. It is then shown that if sV is the
state corresponding to the maximal consistent set V , then (M c, sV ) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ V . This will
not quite work in our logic. We would need to define a canonical valuation function to give
semantics for formulas containing free variables. We deal with this problem by considering
states in the canonical model to consist of maximal consistent sets of sentences. There is
another problem in the presence of quantification since there may be a maximal consistent set
V of sentences such that ¬∀xϕ ∈ V , but ϕ[x/ψ] for all ψ ∈ LK,X,An (Φ). That is, there is
no witness to the falsity of ∀xϕ in V . We deal with this problem by restricting to maximal
consistent sets V that are acceptable in the sense that if ¬∀xϕ ∈ V , then ¬ϕ[x/q] ∈ V for
some primitive proposition q ∈ Φ. This argument requires Φ to be infinite. The details can be
found in the appendix.
To understand why, in general, we need to assume Φ is countably infinite, consider the case
where there is only one agent and Φ = {p}. Let ϕ be the formula that essentially forces the S5
axioms to hold:
∀x(Kx⇒ KKx) ∧ (¬Kx⇒ K¬Kx).
As is well-known, the S5 axioms force every formula in LK1 to be equivalent to a depth-one
formula (i.e., one without nested K’s). Thus, it is not hard to show that there exists a finite
set F of formulas in LK,X,A1 ({p}) such that for all formulas ψ with one free variable y and no
quantification, we have for C ⊆ {r, e, t}
M∀,C1 (Φ,X ) |= (ϕ ∧ ∀xAx)⇒ (∀yψ ⇔ ∧σ∈Fψ[y/ψ]).
Thus, if Φ has only one primitive proposition, then there are circumstances under which uni-
versal quantification is equivalent to a finite conjunction. We can construct similar examples
if Φ is an arbitrary finite set of propositions even if there is more than one agent. (In the latter
case, we add a formula ϕ′ to the antecedent that says that agent 1 knows that all agents have
the same knowledge that he does: ∀xK1 ∧ni=2 (Kix ⇔ K1x).) Thus, if Φ is finite, we would
need extra axioms to capture the fact universal quantification can sometimes be equivalent to a
finite conjunction. We remark that this phenomenon of needing additional axioms if Φ is finite
has been observed before in the literature (cf. [Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi 1992; Halpern and
Lakemeyer 2001]).
If we make further assumptions about the awareness operator, these can also be captured
axiomatically. For example, as shown by FH, the assumption that agents know what they are
aware of corresponds to the axioms
Aiϕ⇒ KiAiϕ and
¬Aiϕ⇒ Ki¬Aiϕ.
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It is not hard to check that awareness being generated by primitive propositions can be captured
by the following axiom:
Aiϕ⇔ ∧{p∈Φ: p occurs in ϕ}Aip.
In this axiom, the empty conjunction is taken to be vacuously true, so that Aiϕ is vacuously
true if no primitive propositions occur in ϕ.
We can axiomatize the fact that awareness is weakly generated by primitive propositions
using the following axioms:
A1. Ai(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇔ Aiϕ ∧Aiψ.
A2. Ai¬ϕ⇔ Aiϕ.
A3. AiXjϕ⇔ Aiϕ.
A4. AiAjϕ⇔ Aiϕ.
A5. AiKjϕ⇔ Aiϕ.
A6. Aiϕ⇒ Aip if p ∈ Φ occurs in ϕ.
A7. Aiϕ[x/ψ]⇒ Ai∃xϕ, where ψ ∈ LK,X,An (Φ).
As noted in [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995], the first five axioms capture awareness
generated by primitive propositions in the language LK,X,An (Φ); we need A6 and A7 to deal
with quantification. A7 captures the fact that awareness is closed under existential quantifica-
tion.
5 Complexity
Since the logic is axiomatizable, the validity problem is at worst recursively enumerable. As
the next theorem shows, the validity problem is no better than r.e.
Theorem 5.1: The problem of deciding if a formula in the language L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) is valid in
MCn (Φ,X ) is r.e.-complete, for all C ⊆ {r, t, e} and n ≥ 1.
Proof: The fact that deciding validity is r.e. follows immediately from Theorem 2.1. For the
hardness result, we show that, for every formula ϕ in first-order logic over a language with
a single binary predicate can be translated to a formula ϕt ∈ L∀,K,A1 (Φ,X ) such that ϕ is
valid over relational models iff ϕt is valid in M∅n(Φ,X ) (and hence in MCn (Φ,X ), for all
C ⊆ {r, t, e}. We leave details of the reduction to the appendix. The result follows from the
well-known fact that the validity problem for first-order logic with one binary predicate is r.e.
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Theorem 5.1 is somewhat surprising, since Fine [1970] shows that his logic (which is based
on S5) is decidable. It turns out that each of the following suffices to get undecidability: (a) the
presence of the awareness operator, (b) the presence of more than one agent, or (c) not having
e ∈ C (i.e., not assuming that the K relation satisfies the Euclidean property). The fact that
awareness gives undecidability is the content of Theorem 5.1; Theorem 5.2 shows that having
n ≥ 2 or e /∈ C suffices for undecidability as well. On the other hand, Theorem 5.3 shows
that if n = 1 and e ∈ C, then the problem is decidable. Although, as we have observed, our
semantics is slightly differently from that of Fine, we believe that corresponding results hold in
his setting. Thus, he gets decidability because he does not have awareness, restricts to a single
agent, and considers S5 (as opposed to say, S4).
Let L∀,Kn (Φ,X ) consist of all formulas in L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) that do not mention the Ai or Xi
operators.
Theorem 5.2: The problem of deciding if a formula in the languageL∀,Kn (Φ) is valid inMCn (Φ)
is r.e.-complete if n ≥ 2 or if e /∈ C.
Theorem 5.3: The validity problem for the language L∀,K1 (Φ,X ) with respect to the structures
in MC1 (Φ,X ) for C ⊇ {e} is decidable.
Interestingly, the role of the Euclidean property in these complexity results mirrors its role
in complexity for LKn , basic epistemic logic without awareness or quantification. As we have
shown [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006a], the problem of deciding if a formula in the language LKn (Φ)
is valid in MCn (Φ) is PSPACE complete if n ≥ 2 or n ≥ 1 and e /∈ C; if n = 1 and e ∈ C, it
is co-NP-complete.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a logic to model agents who are able to reason about their lack of awareness.
We have shown that such reasoning arises in a number of situations. We have provided a
complete axiomatization for the logic, and examined the complexity of the validity problem.
Our original motivation for considering knowledge of unawareness came from game the-
ory. Notions like Nash equilibrium do not make sense in the presence of lack of awareness.
Intuitively, a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each agent would continue playing the
same strategy despite knowing what strategies the other agents are using. But if an agent is not
aware of the moves available to other agents, then he cannot even contemplate the actions of
other players. In a companion paper [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006b], we show how to generalize
the notion of Nash equilibrium so that it applies in the presence of (knowledge of) unaware-
ness. Feinberg [2004] has already shown that awareness can play a significant role in analyzing
games. (In particular, he shows that a small probability of an agent not being aware of the pos-
sibility of defecting in finitely repeated prisoners dilemma can lead to cooperation.) It is not
hard to show that knowledge of unawareness can have a similarly significant impact. Con-
sider, for example, a chess game. If we interpret “lack of awareness” as “unable to compute”
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(cf. [Fagin and Halpern 1988]), then although all players understand in principle all the moves
that can be made, they are certainly not aware of all consequences of all moves. Such lack
of awareness has strategic implications. For example, in cases where the opponent is under
time pressure, experts will make deliberately make moves that lead to positions that are hard
to analyze. (In our language, these are positions where there is a great deal of unawareness.)
The logic we have presented here provides an initial step to modeling the reasoning that goes
on in games with (knowledge of) unawareness. To fully model what is going on, we need to
capture probability as well as awareness and knowledge. We do not think that there will be any
intrinsic difficulty in extending our logic to handle probability along the lines of the work in
[Fagin and Halpern 1994; Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990], although we have not checked
the details.
A Proof of Theorems
Theorem 4.1: Let C be a (possibly empty) subset of {T, 4, 5} and let C be the corresponding
subset of {r, t, e}. Then K∀n ∪ C is a sound and complete axiomatization of the language
L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) with respect to M∀,Cn (Φ,X ).
Proof: We give the proof only for the case C = ∅; the other cases follow using standard
techniques (see, for example, [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995; Hughes and Cresswell
1996]). Showing that a provable formula ϕ is valid can be done by a straightforward induction
on the length of the proof of ϕ, using the fact that all axioms in K∀n are valid in M∀,∅n (Φ,X )
and all inference rules preserve validity in M∀,∅n (Φ,X ).
As we said in the main text, we prove completeness by modifying the standard canonical
model construction, restricting to acceptable maximal consistent sets of sentences. Thus, the
first step in the proof is to guarantee that every consistent sentence is included in an acceptable
maximal consistent set of sentences.
If q is a primitive proposition, we define ϕ[q/x] and the notion of x being substitutable for
q just as we did for the case that q is a propositional variable.
Lemma A.1: If K∀n ∪ C ⊢ ϕ and x is substitutable for q in ϕ, then K∀n ∪ C ⊢ ∀xϕ[q/x].
Proof: We first show by induction on the length of the proof of ϕ that if z is a variable that
does not appear in any formula in the proof of ϕ, then K∀n ∪ C ⊢ ϕ[q/z]. If there is a proof of
ϕ of length one, then ϕ is an instance of an axiom. It is easy to see that ϕ[q/z] is an instance
of the same axiom. (We remark that it is important in the case of axioms N∀ and 1∀ that z does
not occur in ϕ.) Suppose that the lemma holds for all ϕ′ that have a proof of length no greater
than k, and suppose that ϕ has a proof of length k+1 where z does not occur in any formula of
the proof. If the last step of the proof of ϕ is an axiom, then ϕ is an instance of an axiom, and
we have already dealt with this case. Otherwise, the last step in the proof of ϕ is an application
of either MP, GenK , or Gen∀. We consider these in turn.
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If MP is applied at the last step, then there exists some ϕ′, such that ϕ′ and ϕ′ ⇒ ϕ were
previously proved and, by assumption, z does not occur in any formula of their proof. By the
induction hypothesis, both ϕ′[q/z] and (ϕ′ ⇒ ϕ)[q/z] = ϕ′[q/z] ⇒ ϕ[q/z] are provable. The
result now follows by an application of MP.
The argument for GenK and Gen∀ is essentially identical, so we consider them together.
Suppose that GenK (resp., Gen∀) is applied at the last step. Then ϕ has the form Kiϕ′ (resp.,
∀yϕ′) and there is a proof of length at most k for ϕ′ where z does not occur in any formula in
the proof. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, ϕ′[q/z] is provable. By applying GenK (resp.,
Gen∀), it immediately follows that ϕ[q/z] is provable.
This completes the proof thatϕ[q/z] is provable. By applying Gen∀, it follows that ∀zϕ[q/z]
is provable. Since x is substitutable for q in ϕ, x must be substitutable for z in ϕ[q/z]. Thus,
by applying the axiom 1∀ and MP, we can prove ϕ[q/x]. The fact that ∀xϕ[q/x] is provable
now follows from Gen∀.
Lemma A.2: Every K∀n-consistent sentence ϕ is contained in some acceptable maximal K∀n-
consistent set of sentences.
Proof: We first show that if ∆ is a finite K∀n-consistent set of sentences, ¬∀xψ ∈ ∆, and
q is a primitive proposition that does not appear in any sentence in ∆, then ∆ ∪ ¬ϕ[x/q] is
K∀n-consistent. Suppose not. Then there exist sentences β1, . . . , βk ∈ ∆ such that
K∀n ⊢ (β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βk)⇒ ψ[x/q].
By Lemma A.1, we have
K∀n ⊢ ∀x((β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βk)⇒ ψ). (1)
Now applying K∀ and N∀, and using the fact that x is not free in β1 ∧ . . .∧βk (since β1, . . . , βk
are sentences), it easily follows that
K∀n ⊢ (β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βk)⇒ ∀xψ.
Since β1, . . . , βk,¬∀xψ ∈ ∆, this contradicts the assumption that ∆ is K∀n-consistent.
We now use standard techniques to construct an acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of
sentences containing ϕ. Consider an enumeration {ψ1, ψ2, . . .} of the sentences in S∀,K,X,An .
We construct a sequence of K∀n-consistent sets of sentences ∆0,∆1, . . .. Let ∆0 = {ϕ}. For
all k ≥ 1, if ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk} is not K∀n-consistent, ∆k = ∆k−1. If ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk} is K∀n-consistent,
if ψk is not of the form ¬∀yψ′, then ∆k = ∆k−1∪{ψk}, while if ψk is of the form ¬∀yψ′, then
∆k = ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk,¬ψ′[y/q]} for some q ∈ Φ not occurring in ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk}. By our earlier
argument, it easily follows that each set ∆k is K∀n-consistent. Let ∆ be the union of the ∆n’s.
It is easy to see that ∆ is an acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of sentences that contains
ϕ.
For a set Γ of formulas, define Γ/Ki = {ψ : Kiψ ∈ Γ}.
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Lemma A.3: If Γ is a K∀n-consistent set of sentences containing ¬Kiϕ, then Γ/Ki ∪ {¬ϕ} is
K∀n-consistent.
Proof: This is a standard modal logic argument; see, for example, [Hughes and Cresswell
1996, Lemma 6.4]. We omit details here.
Lemma A.4: If Γ is an acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of sentences and ¬Kiϕ ∈ Γ,
then there exists an acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of sentences ∆ such that (Γ/Ki ∪
{¬ϕ}) ⊆ ∆.
Proof: We first show that if Γ/K ∪ {γ1, . . . , γn,¬∀xψ} is a K∀n-consistent set of sentences,
then there exists some q ∈ Φ such that Γ/Ki ∪ {γ1, . . . , γn,¬∀xψ,¬ψ[x/q]} is K∀n-consistent.
For suppose not. Then, for all q, there must exist β1, . . . , βk ∈ Γ/Ki such that
K∀n ⊢ (β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βk)⇒ (γ ⇒ ψ[x/q]),
where γ = γ1 ∧ . . . ∧ γn ∧ ¬∀xψ. By GenK , we have that
K∀n ⊢ Ki((β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βk)⇒ (γ ⇒ ψ[x/q])).
Applying axiom K, and using the fact that K(β1 ∧ . . . ∧ βk) ∈ Γ and Γ is maximal, we
have that Ki(γ ⇒ ψ[x/q]) ∈ Γ for all q. Since Γ is acceptable, it must be the case that
∀xKi(γ ⇒ ψ) ∈ Γ. By the Barcan axiom, it follows that Ki∀x(γ ⇒ ψ) ∈ Γ. Since γ is a
sentence, applying K∀, N∀, K, and GenK , it follows that Ki∀x(γ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ Ki(γ ⇒ ∀xψ) is
provable in K∀n. Hence, Ki(γ ⇒ ∀xψ) ∈ Γ. Thus, γ ⇒ ∀xψ ∈ Γ/Ki. But this contradicts the
consistency of Γ/K ∪ {γ1, . . . , γn,¬∀xψ}.
We now proceed much as in the proof of Lemma A.2. Given an enumeration ψ1, ψ2, . . .
of the sentences in S∀,K,X,An , we construct a sequence of K∀n-consistent sets of sentences
∆0,∆1, . . .. Let ∆0 = Γ/Ki∪{¬ϕ}. (Note that Lemma A.3 implies that ∆0 is K∀n-consistent.)
For all k ≥ 1, if ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk} is not K∀n-consistent, ∆k = ∆k−1. If ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk} is K∀n-
consistent, if ψk is not of the form ¬∀yψ′, then ∆k = ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk}, while if ψk is of the form
¬∀yψ′, then ∆k = ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk,¬ψ′[y/q]} for some q ∈ Φ such that ∆k−1 ∪ {ψk,¬ψ′[y/q]}
is consistent. (Such a q exists by our earlier argument.) It is easy to see that ∆ = ∪n∆n is the
desired acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of sentences.
We are now able to prove the following key lemma.
Lemma A.5: If ϕ is a K∀n-consistent sentence, then ϕ is satisfiable in M∀,∅n (Φ,X ).
Proof: Let M c = (S,K1, ...,Kn,A1, . . . ,An, pi) be a canonical awareness structure con-
structed as follows
• S = {sV : V is an acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of sentences};
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• pi(sV , p) =
{
1 if p ∈ V ,
0 if p /∈ V ;
• Ai(sV ) = {ϕ : Aiϕ ∈ V };
• Ki(sV ) = {sW : V/Ki ⊆W}.
We show as usual that if ψ is a sentence, then
(M c, sV ) |= ψ iff ψ ∈ V. (2)
Note that this claim suffices to prove Lemma A.5 since, if ϕ is a K∀n-consistent sentence, by
Lemma A.2, it is contained in an acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of sentences.
We prove (2) by induction of the depth of nesting of ∀, with a subinduction on the length
of the sentence.
The base case is if ψ is a primitive proposition, in which case (2) follows immediately from
the definition of pi. For the inductive step, given ψ, suppose that (2) holds for all formulas ψ′
such that either the depth of nesting for ∀ in ψ′ is less than that in ψ, or the depth of nesting is
the same, and ψ′ is shorter than ψ. We proceed by cases on the form of ψ.
• If ψ has the form ¬ψ′ or ψ1 ∧ ψ2, then the result follows easily from the inductive
hypothesis.
• If ψ has the form Aiψ′, then note that ϕ′ is a sentence and (M c, sV ) |= Aiψ′ iff ψ′ ∈
Ai(sV ) iff Aiψ′ ∈ V .
• If ψ has the formKiψ′, then if ψ ∈ V , then ψ′ ∈ W for everyW such that sW ∈ Ki(sV ).
By the induction hypothesis, (M c, sW ) |= ψ′ for every sW ∈ Ki(sV ), so (M c, sV ) |=
Kiψ
′
. If ψ /∈ V , then ¬ψ ∈ V since V is a maximal K∀n-consistent set. By Lemma
A.4, there exists an acceptable maximal K∀n-consistent set of sentences W such that
(V/Ki∪{¬ψ′}) ⊆ W . By the induction hypothesis, (M c, sW ) 6|= ψ′. Thus, (M c, sV ) 6|=
Kiψ
′
.
• If ψ has the form Xiψ′, the argument is immediate from the preceding two cases and the
observation that (M, sV ) |= Xiψ′ iff both (M, sV ) |= Kiψ′ and (M, sV ) |= A′ψ, while
Xiψ
′ ∈ V iff both Kiψ′ ∈ V and Aiψ′ ∈ V .
• Finally, suppose that ψ = ∀xψ′. If ψ ∈ V then, by axiom 1∀, ψ′[x/ϕ] ∈ V for all ϕ ∈
LK,X,An (Φ). The depth of nesting of ψ′[x/ϕ] is less than that of ∀xψ′, so by the induction
hypothesis (M, sV ) |= ψ′[x/ϕ] for all ϕ ∈ LK,X,An (Φ). By definition, (M, sV ) |= ψ,
as desired. If ψ /∈ V then, since V is acceptable, there exists a primitive proposition
q ∈ Φ such that ψ′[x/q] /∈ V . By the induction hypothesis, (M c, sV ) 6|= ψ′[x/q]. Thus,
(M c, sV ) 6|= ψ, as desired.
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To finish the completeness proof, suppose that ϕ is valid in M∀,∅n (Φ,X ). Then, consider
two cases: (1) ϕ is a sentence, and (2) ϕ is not a sentence. If (1), then ¬ϕ is a sentence and
is not satisfiable in M∀,∅n (Φ,X ). So, by Lemma A.5, ¬ϕ is not K∀n-consistent. Thus, ϕ is
provable in K∀n. If (2) and {x1, . . . , xk} is the set of free variables in ϕ, then ∀x1 . . .∀xkϕ is a
valid sentence. Thus, by case (1), ∀x1 . . .∀xkϕ is provable in K∀n. Applying 1∀ repeatedly it
follows that ϕ is provable in K∀n, as desired.
Theorem 5.1: Deciding if a formula in the language L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ) is valid inMCn (Φ,X ) is
r.e.-complete, for all C ⊆ {r, t, e} and n ≥ 1.
Proof: The fact that deciding validity is r.e. follows immediately from Theorem 2.1. For the
hardness result, to do the reduction, we first fix some notation. Take an R-formula to be a first-
order formula (without equality) whose only nonlogical symbol is the binary predicateR. Take
an R-model to be a relational structure which provides an interpretation for R. A countable
R model is an R model with a countable domain. It is well known that the satisfiability prob-
lem for R-formulas is undecidable [Lewis 1979]. Thus, it suffices to reduce the satisfiability
problem for R-formulas to the satisfiability problem for formulas in L∀,K,X,An (Φ,X ).
For easy of exposition, assume that the set Φ of primitive propositions includes q1, q2, and
r; later we show how to get rid of this assumption. Given an R-model N , we will construct
an awareness structure M that represents N . Roughly speaking, a state in M represents an
ordered pair of domain elements in N . The primitive proposition r will be true at a state s in
M iff R(d1, d2) is true in N of the pair (d1, d2) represented by s. The primitive propositions q1
and q2 are used to encode d1 and d2. Let σ be the awareness formula that, roughly speaking,
forces it to be the case that for all states s, if r is true at some state t that represents (d1, d2)
such that (s, t) ∈ K, then r is true at all states t′ that represent (d1, d2) such that (s, t′) ∈ K. (It
follows that if ¬r is true at some state t that represents (d1, d2) such that (s, t) ∈ K, then ¬r is
true at all states t′ that represent (d1, d2) such that (s, t′) ∈ K. The formula σ is
∀x1∀x2(¬K¬(A(x1 ∧ q1) ∧ A(x2 ∧ q2) ∧ r)⇒ K((A(x1 ∧ q1) ∧A(x2 ∧ q2))⇒ r)).
Now we translate an R-formula ψ to an awareness formula ψt. We consider only R-formulas
formulas in negation normal form, i.e., formulas ψ that use ∧, ∨, ∀, and ∃, where the negation
has been pushed in so that it occurs only in front of the predicate R. It is well known that every
R-formula is equivalent to a formula in negation normal form.
• (R(x, y))t = ¬K¬(r ∧A(x ∧ q1) ∧ A(y ∧ q2))
• (¬R(x, y))t = ¬K¬(¬r ∧ A(x ∧ q1) ∧A(y ∧ q2))
• (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)t = ϕt1 ∧ ϕ
t
2
• (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)t = ϕt1 ∨ ϕ
t
2
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• (∀xϕ)t = ∀xϕt
• (∃xϕ)t = ∃xϕt
We say that an awareness structure M = (S,K,A, pi) is universal if K = S×S. It is easy
to see that if M is a universal structure, then M ∈ MC1 (Φ,X ) for all C ⊆ {r, t, e}. Moreover,
an easy argument by induction on structure, whose proof we leave to the reader, shows the
following.
Lemma A.6: If M = (S, . . .) is a universal structure, then for all R-formulas in nega-
tion normal form and V is a syntactic valuation, then (M, s,V) |= ψt for some s ∈ S iff
(M, s′,V) |= ψt for all states s′ ∈ S.
We write (M,V) |= ψt if (M, s,V) |= ψt for all s ∈ S.
Theorem 5.1 follows from the following claim:
For all C ⊆ {r, t, e}, ϕ is satisfiable in an R-model iff ϕt ∧ σ is satisfiable in MC1 (Φ,X ).
(3)
To prove (3), first suppose that ψ is a satisfiable R-formula. It is well known that an R-
formula is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in a countable R-model [Enderton 1972] (that is, an R-
model with a countable domain. (Of course, this result holds for arbitrary first-order formulas,
not just R-formulas.) Thus, we can assume without loss of generality that ψ is satisfied in the
R-model N with countable domain DN .
Let L be a surjection from LK,X,A1 (Φ) to DN . (Since DN is countable, such a surjection
exists.) Given the R-model N with countable domain DN , define MN = (S,K,A, pi) to be the
universal awareness structure such that
• S = {(d1, d2) : d1, d2 ∈ DN};
• pi((d1, d2), r) = true iff (d1, d2) ∈ R;
• pi((d1, d2), q) = true for all q ∈ Φ− {r};
• A((d1, d2)) = {ψ ∧ q1 : L(ψ) = d1} ∪ {ψ′ ∧ q2 : L(ψ′) = d2}.
It is easy to check that MN |= σ; we leave the proof to the reader. Thus, it suffices to show
that there is some state s and syntactic valuation V such that (MN , s,V) |= ϕt. This follows
from the following result.
Lemma A.7: For every first-order formula ψ in negation normal form, if N |= ψ then MN |=
ψt.
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Proof: We actually prove a slightly more general result. A syntactic valuationV isL-compatible
with a valuation V on N (that is, a function mapping variables to elements of DN ) if, for all
variables x, L(V(x)) = V (x). We show that for all first-order formulas ψ (not necessarily a
sentence) and all valuations V on N , if (N, V ) |= ψ, then (MN ,V) |= ψt for all syntactic
valuations V L-compatible with V . The proof is by induction on structure.
Suppose that ψ = R(x, y). Then, (N, V ) |= ψ iff s = (V (x), V (y)) ∈ R. By definition,
s ∈ R iff pi(s, r) = true and (MN , s,V) |= A(x∧q1)∧A(y∧q2) for all syntactic valuations V
L-compatible with V. Since MN is universal and R(x, y)t = ¬K¬(r ∧A(x∧ q1)∧A(y ∧ q2)),
it follows that (MN ,V) |= R(x, y)t for all V L-compatible with V . A similar argument applies
if ψ is of the form ¬R(x, y). If ψ = ψ1 ∧ψ2 or ψ = ψ1 ∨ψ2, the result follows easily from the
induction hypothesis. Suppose that ψ = ∀xψ′, (N, V ) |= ∀xψ′, and V is L-compatible with
V . We want to show that (MN ,V) |= ψt. Since ψt = ∀x(ψ′)t, we must show that (MN ,V ′) |=
(ψ′)t for all V ′ ∼x V . Given a valuation V ′ ∼x V , consider the valuation V ′ = L◦V ′ onN ; that
is, V ′(y) = L(V ′(y)) for all variables y. Clearly, if y 6= x, V ′(y) = L(V ′(y)) = L(V(y)) =
V (y). Thus, V ′ ∼x V , so (N, V ′) |= ψ′. Moreover, since V ′ is clearly L-compatible with V ′,
it follows from the induction hypothesis that (MN ,V ′) |= (ψ′)t. Hence, (MN ,V) |= ∀x(ψ′)t,
as desired. Finally, suppose that ψ = ∃xψ′, (N, V ) |= ψ, and V is L-compatible with V . We
want to show that (MN ,V) |= ψt. Since (N, V ) |= ∃xψ′, there must exist some valuation
V ′ ∼x V such that (N, V ′) |= ψ′. By the induction hypothesis, for all V ′′ L-compatible with
V ′, we have (MN ,V ′′) |= (ψ′)t. Choose some formula ϕ′ ∈ L−1(V ′(x)) (such a ϕ′ exists since
L is a surjection). Define V ′ by taking V ′(y) = V(y) for y 6= x and V ′(x) = ϕ′. Clearly
V ′ is L-compatible with V ′. Thus, (MN ,V ′) |= (ψ′)t, by the induction hypothesis. Hence,
(MN ,V) |= ∃x(ψ′)t. This completes the induction proof.
We have now proved one direction of (3): for all C ⊆ {r, t, e}, if ϕ is satisfiable in some
R-model, then ϕt ∧ σ is satisfiable in some structure in MCn (Φ,X ). For the converse, suppose
that ϕt∧σ is satisfiable in some structureM = (S,K, A, pi) inMC1 (Φ,X ). If (M, s) |= ϕt∧σ,
then define an R-model NM,s whose domain DM,s = LK,X,A1 (Φ) and RM,s (the interpretation
of R in NM,s) is {(ψ, ψ′) : pi(t, r) = true for all t such that (s, t) ∈ K, ψ ∧ q1 ∈ A(t), and
ψ′ ∧ q2 ∈ A(t)}. Note that because the domain on NM,s is LK,X,A1 (Φ), a syntactic valuation is
also a valuation on NM,s. The other direction of (3) follows immediately from the following
result.
Lemma A.8: For all formulas ψ in negation normal form and all syntactic valuations V , if
(M, s,V) |= ψt ∧ σ then (NM,s,V) |= ψ.
Proof: We prove the lemma by induction on the length of ψ. If ψ = R(x, y) and (M, s,V) |=
ψt ∧ σ, then that there exists t such that (s, t) ∈ K, pi(t, r) = true, V(x) ∧ q1 ∈ A(t), and
V(y) ∧ q2 ∈ A(t). Since σ implies that for all t′ such that (s, t′) ∈ K, V(x) ∧ q1 ∈ A(t′) and
V(y) ∧ q2 ∈ A(t′), it must be the case that pi(t′, r) = true. Thus, by definition of RM,s, it
follows that (V(x),V(y)) ∈ RM,s. Therefore, (NM,s,V) |= ψ. A similar argument applies if
ψ is of the form ¬R(x, y). If ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 or ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2, the result follows easily from
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the induction hypothesis. If ψ = ∀xψ′ and (M, s,V) |= ψt ∧ σ, then, since σ is a sentence,
for all V ′ ∼x V , we have (M, s,V ′) |= (ψ′)t ∧ σ. By the induction hypothesis, it follows
that (NM,s,V ′) |= ψ′ for all V ′ such that V ′ ∼x V . Since Dn = LK,X,A1 (Φ), it follows that
(NM,s,V) |= ∀xψ′. Finally, suppose that ψ = ∃xψ′ and (M, s,V) |= ψt ∧ σ. Again, since σ
is a sentence, there exists some V ′ ∼x V such that (M, s,V ′) |= (ψ′)t ∧ σ. By the induction
hypothesis, it follows that (NM,s,V ′) |= ψ′. Thus, (NM,s,V) |= ∃xψ′, as desired.
This completes the proof of (3) and Theorem 5.1. Note that exactly the same proof works
if we take q2 = ¬q1 and r = q1. Therefore, the assumption that Φ includes q1, q2 and r can be
made without loss of generality.
Theorem 5.2: The problem of deciding if a formula in the language L∀,Kn is valid in MCn (Φ)
is r.e.-complete if n ≥ 2 or if e /∈ C.
Proof: The fact that deciding validity is r.e. in all these cases follows immediately from
Theorem 2.1.
To prove hardness, we start with the case that e ∈ C and n = 2. For ease of exposition,
we assume that Φ is countably infinite. We show at the end of the proof how to remove this
assumption. Let an R-formula, an R-model, and an countable R model be as defined in the
proof of Theorem 5.1. Again, it suffices to reduce the satisfiability problem for R-formulas to
the satisfiability problem for formulas in L∀,Kn (Φ,X ).
Assume that Φ contains the primitive propositions p, q, and r. Our goal is to write a modal
formula that forces a model to have four types of states:
• States satisfying ¬p ∧¬q. Intuitively, these states will represent pairs (d1, d2) of domain
elements in an R-model.
• States satisfying p ∧ ¬q. Intuitively, these states represent the first element d1 in a pair
(d1, d2).
• States satisfying ¬p∧q. Intuitively, these states represent the second element d2 in a pair
(d1, d2).
• States satisfying p ∧ q. Intuitively, these states represent domain elements.
We want it to be the case that the states satisfying ¬p ∧ ¬q form a K1 equivalence class; for
each state satisfying ¬p ∧ ¬q, there is a K2-edge going to a state satisfying p ∧ ¬q and one
going to a state satisfying ¬p ∧ q. Intuitively, this triple of states represents a pair (d1, d2),
the first component of the pair, and the second component of the pair. Finally, from each state
satisfying p ∧ ¬q or ¬p ∧ q, there is a K1-edge to a state satisfying p ∧ q; the latter state is the
one that determines the domain element. Finally, the primitive proposition r is true at a state
satisfying ¬p ∧ ¬q iff R(d1, d2) holds in the R-model. (We remark that this construction is
somewhat similar in spirit to a construction used by Engelhardt, van der Meyden, and Moses
[2005] to prove that, in the case of semantic valuations, the validity problem is Π2- complete.)
Figure 1 describes the desired situation:
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Figure 1: States.
In the figure, the K1 relation consists of the pairs joined by dotted lines; the K2 consists of
the pairs liked by the continuous edges. (In both cases we omit self-loops.)
Let atomic(x ) be an abbreviation for the formula
¬K1K2K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ x) ∧ ¬∃y(¬K1K2K1¬(x ∧ y) ∧ ¬K1K2K1¬(x ∧ ¬y)).
Intuitively, atomic(x ) is true if all K1K2K1-reachable worlds that satisfy x agree on all sen-
tences. We use worlds where p∧q∧x holds for some atomic formula x to represent elements in
d. If two worlds satisfy the same atomic formula, then they represent the same domain element.
Let σ1 be the modal formula that forces the set of atomic formulas to be non-empty. σ1 is
an abbreviation for ∃x(atomic(x )).
Let σ2 be the modal formula that, roughly speaking, forces it to be the case that if r is true
at some state t that represents (d1, d2) (i.e., a state where ¬p ∧ ¬q is true), then r is true at
all states t′ that represent (d1, d2). (It follows that if ¬r is true at some state t that represents
(d1, d2), then ¬r is true at all states t′ that represent (d1, d2).) The formula σ2 is an abbreviation
for
∀x∀y((atomic(x ) ∧ atomic(y)∧
¬K1¬(r ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬K2¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ x)) ∧ ¬K2¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ y))))
⇒ K1(¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬K2¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ x)) ∧ ¬K2¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ y))⇒ r)).
Let σ = σ1 ∧ σ2.
We now translate an R-formula ψ to an awareness formula ψt. We consider only R-
formulas formulas in negation normal form.
• (R(x, y))t = atomic(x )∧atomic(y)∧¬K1¬(r ∧¬p∧¬q ∧¬K2¬(p∧¬q ∧¬K1¬(p∧
q ∧ x )) ∧ ¬K2¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ y)));
• (¬R(x, y))t = atomic(x )∧atomic(y)∧¬K1¬(¬r∧¬p∧¬q∧¬K2¬(p∧¬q∧¬K1¬(p∧
q ∧ x )) ∧ ¬K2¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ y)));
• (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)
t = ϕt1 ∧ ϕ
t
2;
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• (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)
t = ϕt1 ∨ ϕ
t
2;
• (∀xϕ)t = ∀x(atomic(x )⇒ ϕt);
• (∃xϕ)t = ∃x(atomic(x ) ∧ ϕt).
Theorem 5.2 in the case that C ⊇ {e} follows from the following claim: If e ∈ C and
n ≥ 2, then
For every R-sentence ψ, ψ is satisfiable in an R-model iff ψt ∧ σ is satisfiable in MCn (Φ,X ).
(4)
To prove (4), first suppose that ψ is a satisfiable R-sentence. As in Theorem 5.1, we can
assume without loss of generality that ψ is satisfied in an R-model N with countable domain
DN . Let L be a surjection from Φ−{p, q, r} toDN . (SinceDN is countable and Φ is countably
infinite, by assumption, such a surjection exists.) Define MN = (S,K1,K2, pi) to be the Kripke
structure such that
• S = DN ∪ (DN ×DN} ∪
2
i=1 {(d1, d2, i) : d1, d2 ∈ DN};
• pi(s, r) = true iff (d1, d2) ∈ R, and s = (d1, d2);
• pi(s, p) = true iff either s ∈ DN or s is of the form (d1, d2, 1) for some d1, d2 ∈ DN ;
• pi(s, q) = true iff either s ∈ DN or s is of the form (d1, d2, 2) for some d1, d2 ∈ DN ;
• for all p′ ∈ Φ− {p, q, r}, pi(s, p′) = true iff L(p′) = d and s = d;
• K1(s) = (DN × DN ) for s ∈ (DN × DN), and K1((d1, d2, 1)) = K1((d2, d1, 2)) =
K1(d1) = {(d1, d2, 1), (d2, d1, 2), d1} for d1, d2 ∈ DN ;
• K2((d1, d2)) = K2((d1, d2, 1)) = K1((d1, d2, 2)) = {(d1, d2), (d1, d2, 1), (d1, d2, 2)} for
d1, d2 ∈ DN , and K2(d) = {d} for d ∈ DN .
It is easy to check that MN ∈ Mr,e,t2 (Φ,X ) (and hence also in MC2 (Φ,X ) for all C such
that e ∈ C) and that (MN , (d1, d2)) |= σ for all (d1, d2) ∈ DN ×DN (note that σ is a sentence
and therefore is independent of the valuation); we leave the proof to the reader. Thus, it suffices
to show that there exists a state s∗ ∈ DN × DN such that (MN , s∗) |= ψt. This follows from
the following result.
Lemma A.9: If s∗ ∈ DN ×DN , then for every first-order sentence ψ in negation normal form,
if N |= ψ then (MN , s∗) |= ψt.
Proof: Fix s∗ ∈ DN × DN . We actually prove a slightly more general result. A syntactic
valuation V is MN -compatible with a valuation V on N if, for all variables x and all s ∈ S,
(MN , s,V) |= x iff s = V (x). We show that for all first-order formulas ψ (not just sentences)
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and all valuations V on N , if (N, V ) |= ψ, then (MN , s∗,V) |= ψt for all syntactic valuations
V MN -compatible with V . The proof is by induction on structure.
Suppose that ψ = R(x, y). Then, (N, V ) |= ψ iff (V (x), V (y)) ∈ R. By definition of
pi, if (V (x), V (y)) ∈ R then pi((V (x), v(y)), r) = true. Let V be a syntactic valuation MN -
compatible with V . By definition, (MN , s1,V) |= x iff s1 = V (x) and (MN , s2,V) |= y iff
s2 = V (y). Thus, by definition of MN , it is easy to see that (MN , s∗,V) |= atomic(x ) ∧
atomic(y). By definition of K1 and pi, we have (MN , (V (x), V (y), 1),V) |= ¬K1¬(p∧ q ∧ x)
and (MN , (V (x), V (y), 2),V) |= ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ y). By definition of K2 and pi, it follows that
(MN , (V (x), V (y)),V) |= r ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬K2¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ x)) ∧ ¬K2¬(¬p ∧
q ∧¬K1¬(p∧ q ∧ y)). Since (V (x), V (y)) ∈ K1(s∗), (MN , s∗,V) |= atomic(x )∧ atomic(y),
and (R(x, y))t = atomic(x )∧ atomic(y)∧¬K1¬(r ∧¬p ∧¬q ∧¬K2¬(p ∧¬q ∧¬K1¬(p ∧
q ∧ x )) ∧ ¬K2¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ y))), it follows that (MN , s∗,V) |= R(x, y)t for all
V MN -compatible with V . A similar argument applies if ψ is of the form ¬R(x, y).
If ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 or ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2, the result follows easily from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ψ = ∃xψ′, (N, V ) |= ψ, and V is MN -compatible with V . We want to show
that (MN , s∗,V) |= ψt. Since (N, V ) |= ∃xψ′, there must exist some valuation V ′ ∼x V such
that (N, V ′) |= ψ′. By the induction hypothesis, for all V ′′ MN -compatible with V ′, we have
(MN , s
∗,V ′′) |= (ψ′)t. Choose some primitive proposition p′ ∈ L−1(V ′(x)) (such a p′ exists
since L is a surjection). Define V ′ by taking V ′(y) = V(y) for y 6= x and V ′(x) = p′. Clearly
V ′ is MN -compatible with V ′. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, (MN , s∗,V ′) |= (ψ′)t. Since
(MN , s
∗,V ′) |= atomic(x ), we have (MN , s∗,V) |= ∃x(atomic(x ) ∧ (ψ′)t) for all V MN -
compatible with V .
Finally, suppose that ψ = ∀xψ′, (N, V ) |= ∀xψ′, and V is MN -compatible with V . We
want to show that (MN , s∗,V) |= ψt. Since ψt = ∀x(atomic(x )⇒ (ψ′)t), we must show that
(MN , s
∗,V ′) |= (atomic(x )⇒ (ψ′)t) for all V ′ ∼x V . Given a valuationV ′ ∼x V , suppose that
(MN , s
∗,V ′) |= atomic(x ). It follows that there is a unique t ∈ DN such that (MN , t,V ′) |= x.
Let V ′ be the valuation such that V ′ ∼x V and V ′(x) = t. Since V is MN -compatible with
V , it can be easily shown that V ′ MN -compatible with V ′. It thus follows from the induction
hypothesis that (MN , s∗,V ′) |= (ψ′)t. Hence, (MN , s∗,V) |= ∀x(atomic(x ) ⇒ (ψ′)t), as
desired. This completes the induction proof.
To prove the other direction of (4), suppose that ϕt ∧ σ is satisfiable in some structure
M = (S,K1,K2, pi) ∈ Me2(Φ,X ). If (M, s,V) |= ϕt ∧ σ, then define an R-model NM,s
whose domain DM,s = {ϕ ∈ LK2 (Φ) : (M, s) |= atomic(ϕ)} and RM,s (the interpretation of
R in NM,s) is {(ψ, ψ′) : pi(t, r) = true for all t such that (s, t) ∈ K, (M, t) |= ¬p ∧ ¬q ∧
¬K2¬(p ∧ ¬q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ ψ)) ∧ ¬K2¬(¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬K1¬(p ∧ q ∧ ψ′)). Define V to be
DM,s-compatible with V if V(x) ∈ DM,s implies that V (x) = V(x). The other direction of (4)
follows immediately from the following result.
Lemma A.10: For all formulas ψ in negation normal form and all syntactic valuations V , if
(M, s,V) |= ψt ∧ σ then (NM,s, V ) |= ψ for all V DM,s-compatible with V .
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Proof: We prove the lemma by induction on the structure ofψ. If ψ = R(x, y) and (M, s,V) |=
ψt ∧ σ, then (M, s,V) |= atomic(x ) ∧ atomic(y) and there exists t such that (s, t) ∈ K1 and
(M, t,V) |= r∧¬p∧¬q∧¬K2¬(p∧¬q∧¬K1¬(p∧q∧x))∧¬K2¬(¬p∧q∧¬K1¬(p∧q∧y)).
Since σ implies that for all t′ such that (s, t′) ∈ K1 and (M, t′,V) |= ¬p∧¬q∧¬K2¬(p∧¬q∧
¬K1¬(p∧q∧x))∧¬K2¬(¬p∧q∧¬K1¬(p∧q∧y)), it must be the case that pi(t′, r) = true.
Thus, by definition of RM,s, it follows that (V(x),V(y)) ∈ RM,s. Since V(x),V(y) ∈ DM,s,
(V (x), V (y)) ∈ RM,s for all V DM,s-compatible with V . Therefore, (NM,s, V ) |= ψ for
all V DM,s-compatible with V . A similar argument applies if ψ is of the form ¬R(x, y). If
ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2 or ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2, the result follows easily from the induction hypothesis.
Suppose that ψ = ∀xψ′ and (M, s,V) |= σ ∧ ψt. Since ψt = ∀x(atomic(x ) ⇒ (ψ′)t)
and σ is a sentence, for all V ′ ∼x V , we have (M, s,V ′) |= σ ∧ (atomic(x ) ⇒ (ψ′)t). In
particular, for all V ′ ∼x V such that (M, s,V ′) |= atomic(x ), we have (M, s,V ′) |= (ψ′)t. By
the induction hypothesis, it follows that (NM,s, V ′) |= ψ′ for all V ′ DM,s-compatible with V ′.
Suppose that V isDM,s-compatible with V . We want to show that (NM,s, V ) |= ∀xψ′. Consider
any V ′ ∼x V . Let V ′′ be the syntactic valuation such that V ′′ ∼x V and V ′′(x) = V ′(x). Clearly
V ′ is DM,s-compatible with V ′′. Since V ′′ ∼x V , (M, s,V ′′) |= atomic(x ), and V ′ is DM,s-
compatible with V ′′, the induction hypothesis implies that (NM,s, V ′) |= ψ′. It follows that
(NM,s, V
′) |= ψ′. Therefore, (NM,s, V ) |= ∀xψ′, as desired.
Finally, suppose that ψ = ∃xψ′ and (M, s,V) |= ψt∧σ. Since ψt = ∃x(atomic(x )∧(ψ′)t)
and σ is a sentence, there exists some V ′ ∼x V such that (M, s,V ′) |= σ ∧ atomic(x ) ∧ (ψ′)t .
By the induction hypothesis, it follows that (NM,s, V ′) |= ψ′ for all V ′ DM,s-compatible with
V ′. Let V be DM,s-compatible with V . Let V ′′ be the valuation such that V ′′ ∼x V and
V ′′(x) = V ′(x). Clearly V ′′ is DM,s-compatible with V ′. Thus, by the induction hypothesis,
(NM,s, V
′′) |= ψ′. Since V ′′ ∼x V , it follows that (NM,s, V ) |= ∃xψ′, as desired.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2 in the case that e ∈ C. We next briefly describe
the changes necessary to deal with the case that e /∈ C.
Let atomic′(x ) (resp., σ′1, σ′2, σ′, and ψT ) be the result of replacing every occurrence of
K2 in atomic(x ) (resp., σ1, σ2, σ, and ψt) by K1. (Of course, if t ∈ C, then the K1K1K1 in
atomic(x ) can be simplified to K1.) We now show that (4) holds if C ⊆ {r, t} and n ≥ 1.
For the forward direction, if ψ is satisfiable in an R-model N with a countable domainDN , we
construct a structure M ′N = (S,K
′
1, pi), where S and pi are just as in the construction of MN
and K′1 is given by
• K′1((d1, d2)) = DN×DN∪{(d1, d2, 1), (d1, d2, 2), d1, d2},K
′
1((d1, d2, 1)) = {(d1, d2, 1), d1},
K′1((d1, d2, 2)) = {(d1, d2, 2), d2}, K
′
1(d1) = {d1} for d1, d2 ∈ DN ;
It is easy to check that M ′N ∈ M
r,t
1 (Φ,X ) (and hence also in MC1 (Φ,X ) for all C such that
e /∈ C) and that (M ′N , (d1, d2)) |= σ for all (d1, d2) ∈ DN × DN ; we leave the proof to the
reader. We also leave it to the reader to check that the analogue of Lemma A.9 holds. For
the converse, if ψT ∧ σ′ is satisfiable in a Kripke structure M ∈ M1, we construct an R-
model satisfying ψ using essentially the same construction as above, except that in defining
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the interpretation of R, we replace every occurrence of K2 by K1. We leave it to the reader to
show that the analogue of Lemma A.10 holds.
Up to now we have assumed that Φ is infinite. However, we can apply the techniques
of [Halpern 1995] to show that undecidability holds in all cases even if |Φ| = 1. Suppose
that p∗ ∈ Φ. We briefly sketch the argument in the case that e ∈ C. Let qj be the formula
¬K2K1¬(¬p∗ ∧ ¬(K2K1)jp∗, where (K2K1)j is an abbreviation for j repetitions of K2K1.
Intuitively, qj is true at a state if there is a path that leads to p∗ in one K1K2-step and leads to
¬p∗ in an other j-K1K2 steps. Let r1 be q1 and let rj+1 be qj+1 ∧ ¬r1 ∧ . . .¬rj . Clearly the
formulas rj are clearly mutually exclusive. In σ2, we replace ¬p ∧ q by r1, replace p ∧ ¬q by
r2, replace r ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬q by r3, and replace ¬r ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬q by r4 (so that ¬p ∧ ¬q is replaced by
r3∨ r4). In σ1, we replace p∧ q by ¬(r1∨ r2∨ r3∨ r4). The translation is the same, except that
now the translation for R(x, y) uses r3 instead of r ∧¬q ∧¬q, and the translation for ¬R(x, y)
uses r4. With these changes, the proof of the analogue of Lemma A.10 follows with essentially
no change. To prove the analogue of Lemma A.9, we need to construct the analogue of the
Kripke structure MN . The construction is essentially the same as that given above, except we
need to add extra states to ensure that the appropriate formulas rj holds. For example, we want
to make sure that either r3 or r4 holds at all states in DN ×DN , so we need to add extra states
to ensure that from each state in DN × DN the appropriate path exists. At each state in DN
we ensure that rj holds for some j ≥ 5 and that rj holds at some state in DN for each j ≥ 5.
We then replace the surjection L from Φ− {p, q, r} to DN by a surjection from {r5, r6, . . .} to
DN . We leave details to the reader.
The argument in the case that e /∈ C proceeds along similar lines. If t /∈ C, we use the
same formulas as above, but replace K2K1 by K. If t ∈ C, a slightly different set of formulas
must be used; see [Halpern 1995] for details.
Theorem 5.3: The validity problem for the languageL∀,K1 (Φ,X ) with respect to the structures
in MC1 (Φ,X ) for C ⊇ {e} is decidable.
Proof: First, consider the case C = {r, e, t}. We use ideas originally due to Fine [1969]. The
technical details follow closely the decidability proof given by Engelhardt, van der Meyden,
and Su [2003] for the case where the semantics is given using semantic valuations rather than
syntactic valuations. The proof proceeds by an elimination of quantifiers. Following Fine
[1969], we say that a world w in a structure M is describable by a sentence ϕ is (M,w) |= ϕ
and for all worlds w′, if (M,w) |= ϕ, then for all sentences ψ, (M,w) |= ψ iff (M,w′) |= ψ.
A world is describable if it is describable by some formula ϕ.
Let describable(ϕ) be an abbreviation for
¬K¬ϕ ∧ ¬∃y(¬K¬(ϕ ∧ y) ∧ ¬K¬(ϕ ∧ ¬y)).
Intuitively, describable(ϕ) is satisfiable in a structure iff there is a world in the structure de-
scribable by ϕ. Let Ckϕ be the formula that is satisfiable in a structureM iff there are at least k
distinct describable worlds where ϕ is true that the agent considers possible, where two worlds
are distinct if they disagree on the truth value of at least one formula. That is, Ckϕ for k ≥ 1 is
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an abbreviation for
∃x1 . . . ∃xk(∧1≤i<j≤k¬K(xi ⇔ xj) ∧ ∧ki=1(describable(xi) ∧ ¬K¬(xi ∧ ϕ)))
Let Ekϕ be an abbreviation for Ckϕ ∧ ¬Ck+1ϕ. Note that Ekϕ is satisfied in a structure M
where the K relation is universal iff there are exactly k distinct describable worlds where ϕ is
true.
With semantic valuations, it is not hard to show that ¬K¬ϕ⇔ C1ϕ is valid. But this is not
the case if we use syntactic valuations. For example, let M = (W,K, pi) be the structure where
K is universal and for each of the (uncountably many) truth assignments v to the countably
infinite set of primitive propositions in Φ, there is a unique world wv where pi(wv) = v. Each of
these worlds is clearly distinct. Since there are only countably many formulas and uncountably
many worlds, there must be uncountably many undescribable worlds in this structure. (In fact,
a symmetry argument shows that in this structure no world is describable.) Thus, we need to
distinguish structures where ϕ is satisfiable but none of the worlds in which ϕ is satisfiable is
describable, and structures where ϕ is not satisfiable. (Both types of structures satisfy ¬C1ϕ.)
Let E∞ϕ be an abbreviation for ¬K¬ϕ ∧ ¬C1ϕ and let E0ϕ be an abbreviation for K¬ϕ.
(Note that K¬ϕ⇒ ¬C1ϕ is valid.) It is not hard to show that if E∞ϕ is satisfied in a structure
M , then there are actually infinitely many distinct worlds at which ϕ is true (although none of
them is describable). Finally, if l 6=∞, let Ml,Nϕ be an abbreviation for Elϕ if l < N and for
Clϕ if l ≥ N .
Let p = (p1, . . . , pm) be a vector of primitive propositions and propositional variables.
Define a point atom for p to be a formula of the form l1 ∧ . . . lm where each li is either pi or
¬pi. Let PA(p) denote the set of point atoms of p. Given a point atom a for p and a number
N , define an N-bounded count of a to be a formula of the form Ela where l < N or l =∞, or
CNa. Define a (p, k)-atom to be a formula of the form
a ∧ ∧b∈PA(p)cb,
where a is a point atom for p and cb is an 2k-bounded count of b for each b ∈ PA(p), such that
ca is not E0a. We write At(p,k) for the set of (p, k)-atoms. These atoms have the following
properties.
Lemma A.11:
(a) If A,A′ ∈ At(p, k) are distinct atoms, then Mr,e,t1 |= ¬(A ∧ A′).
(b) Mr,e,t1 |= ∨A∈At(p,k)A.
(c) If A,A′ ∈ At(p, k), then either Mr,e,t1 |= A ⇒ ¬K¬A′ or Mr,e,t1 |= A ⇒ K¬A′.
Moreover, we can effectively decide which holds.
(d) If A ∈ At(p, k + 1) and B ∈ At(p · x, k) where x does not occur in p, then either
Mr,e,t1 |= A ⇒ ∃xB or M
r,e,t
1 |= A ⇒ ¬∃xB. Moreover, we can effectively decide
which holds.
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Proof: For part (a), note that if A and A′ are distinct (p, k)-atoms, then either they differ in
their point atom or they differ in the counting of some point atom. Therefore, it easily follows
that Mr,e,t1 |= ¬(A ∧ A′). For part (b), note that in each world in a structure M ∈ Mr,e,t1 ,
exactly one point atom is true, and for each point atom, exactly one 2k-bounded count holds.
For part (c), it can be easily checked that Mr,e,t1 |= A⇒ ¬K¬A′ iff A and A′ agree on all the
conjuncts that are 2k-bounded counts of some atom in PA(p) and that if a′ is the point atom in
A′, 2k-bounded count of a′ (in both A and A′) is not E0a′. Otherwise, it is easy to check that
Mr,e,t1 |= A⇒ K¬A
′
.
For part (d), suppose that A is a (p, k + 1)-atom and B is a (p · x, k)-atom. Define an
x-partition of a 2k+1-bounded count cb of an atom b ∈ PA(p) to be a formula of the form
e+ ∧ e−, where e+ is a 2k-bounded count of b∧ x, e− is a 2k-bounded count of b∧¬x, and the
following constraints are satisfied:
1. if cb = Elb for l 6= ∞, then e+ = Ml+,2k(b ∧ x) and e− = Ml−,2k(b ∧ ¬x) where
l+ + l− = l;
2. if cb = C2k+1b, then
(a) e+ = C2k(b ∧ x) and e− = C2k(b ∧ ¬x), or
(b) e+ = C2k(b ∧ x) and e− = El−(b ∧ ¬x) where l− < 2k, or
(c) e+ = El+(b ∧ x) and e− = C2k(b ∧ ¬x) where l+ < 2k;
3. if cb = E∞b, then e+ = E∞(b ∧ x) and e− = E∞(b ∧ ¬x).
We claim that if e+ ∧ e− is an x-partition of cb, then Mr,e,t1 |= cb ⇒ ∃x(e+ ∧ e−). To see
that, first suppose that cb = Elb for l 6= ∞. Then we can suppose without loss of generality
that M |= cb, so that b is satisfiable in exactly l describable worlds. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕl be the
formulas describing these worlds, and let ϕ = ∨l+i=1ϕi. It is easy to see that M
r,e,t
1 |= cb ⇒
(e+ ∧ e−)[x/ϕ], as desired. Essentially the same argument works if cb = C2k+1b except that we
replace l by 2k+1 and, in addition, we replace l+ in the definition of ϕ by 2k in case (a); replace
l+ by l− and substituting x for ¬ϕ instead of ϕ in case (b). (No further changes are needed
in case (c).) If cb = E∞b, then b is satisfied at infinitely many distinct worlds, none of which
are describable. Thus, there must exist some formula x such that both b ∧ x and b ∧ ¬x are
satisfiable. Moreover, each of them must be satisfied in infinitely many distinct worlds, none of
which are describable. For if, say, b∧x were satisfied in only finitely many distinct worlds, it is
easy to show that each of these worlds are describable, from which it follows that b is satisfied
in some describable world.
A similar argument shows that if e+ 6= E0(b∧x), thenMr,e,t1 |= b∧cb ⇒ ∃x(b∧x∧e+∧e−),
and if e− 6= E0(b ∧ ¬x), then Mr,e,t1 |= b ∧ cb ⇒ ∃x(b ∧ ¬x ∧ e+ ∧ e−). Conversely, a simple
counting argument shows that if e+ is a 2k-bounded count of b ∧ x, e− is a 2k-bounded count
of b ∧ ¬x, and e+ ∧ e− is not an x partition of cb, then Mr,e,t1 |= cb ⇒ ¬∃x(e+ ∧ e−).
We can assume thatA has the form a∧∧b∈PA(p)cb, whileB has the form a′∧∧b∈PA(p)(c+b ∧
c−b ), where c+b is a 2k-bounded count of b ∧ x and c−b is a 2k-bounded count of b ∧ ¬x. We say
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that B is x-compatible with A if either a′ = a ∧ x and c+a 6= E0(a ∧ x), or a′ = a ∧ ¬x and
c−a 6= E0(a ∧ ¬x), and moreover, for all point atoms b ∈ PA(p), we have that c+b ∧ c−b is an
x-partition of cb. Thus, if B is x-compatible with A, it follows from the observations of the
previous paragraph that
Mr,e,t1 |= A⇒ ∃x(a
′ ∧ c+a ∧ c
−
a ) ∧ ∧b∈(PA(p−{a}))∃x(c
+
b ∧ c
−
b ).
We now show that
Mr,e,t1 |= (∃x(a
′ ∧ c+a ∧ c
−
a ) ∧ ∧b∈(PA(p)−{a})∃x(c
+
b ∧ c
−
b ))⇒ ∃xB.
Suppose that (M,w,V) |= ∃x(a′ ∧ c+a ∧ c−a ) ∧ ∧b∈(PA(p)−{a})∃x(c+b ∧ c−b ) for some M ∈
Mr,e,t1 . Then (M,w,V) |= (a′ ∧ c+a ∧ c−a )[x/ϕa] for some formula quantifier-free sentence
ϕa. Similarly, for every b ∈ PA(p) − {a}, there exists a quantifier-free sentence ϕb such that
(M,w,V) |= (c+b ∧ c
−
b )[x/ϕb]. Note that, for each point atom c ∈ PA(p), we can replace
the formulas ϕc with any formula ψc that agrees with ϕc on c. That is, if M |= (a ∧ ϕa) ⇔
(a ∧ ψa), then (M,w.V) |= (a′ ∧ c+a ∧ c−a )[x/ψa]; similarly, if M |= (b ∧ ϕb)⇔ (b ∧ ψb), then
(M,w,V) |= c+b ∧ c
−
b )[x/ψb]. Let ψ = ∨c∈PA(p)(c ∧ ϕc). It is easy to see that ψ agrees with
each of the formulas ϕc on c. It follows that
(M,w,V) |= (a′ ∧ c+a ∧ c
−
a )[x/ψ] ∧ ∧b∈(PA(p)−{a})(c
+
b ∧ c
−
b )[x/ψ].
Note that ψ may mention variables, since the point atoms in PA(p) may mention variables.
(Recall that {p} may include propositional variables.) However, let ψ′ be the sentence that
results by replacing each variable y in ψ by V(y). Clearly ψ′ is a quantifier-free sentence, and
it is easy to see that
(M,w,V) |= (a′ ∧ c+a ∧ c
−
a )[x/ψ
′] ∧ ∧b∈(PA(p)−{a})(c
+
b ∧ c
−
b )[x/ψ
′].
Thus, (M,w) |= ∃xB, as desired. It follows that if B is x-compatible with A, then Mr,e,t1 |=
A⇒ ∃xB.
On the other hand, suppose that B is not x-compatible with A. Then we have that either
(1) a′ is not of the form a ∧ x or a ∧ ¬x; (2) a′ is of the form a ∧ x but c+a = E0(a ∧ x); (3) a′
is of the form a∧¬x but c−a = E0(a∧¬x); or (4) there exists a point atom b such that c+b ∧ c−b
is not an x-partition of cb. In each case, it is immediate that Mr,e,t1 |= A⇒ ¬∃xB.
Let L∀,K1 (p, k) consist of all formulas in L
∀,K
1 (p) with depth of quantification at most k.
For a formula ψ ∈ L∀,K1 (p, k), let At(p, k, ψ) = {A ∈ At(p, k) :M
r,e,t
1 |= A⇒ ψ}.
Lemma A.12: For all ϕ ∈ L∀,K1 (p, k), At(p, k) = At(p, k, ϕ) ∪ At(p, k,¬ϕ). Moreover, the
sets At(p, k, ϕ) and At(p, k,¬ϕ) are effectively computable.
Proof: We proceed by induction on k with a subinduction on the structure of ϕ. For all k, the
statement is immediate if ϕ is a primitive proposition or propositional variable in {p}, and the
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result follows easily from the induction hypothesis if ϕ is of the form¬ϕ′ or of the form ϕ1∧ϕ2.
If ϕ is of the formKϕ′, by Lemma A.11(c), we can effectively compute the setAt(p, k,K¬B)
for each (p, k)-atom B. It is easy to see that Mr,e,t1 |= A ⇒ Kϕ iff M
r,e,t
1 |= A ⇒ K¬B
for all B ∈ At(p, k,¬ϕ′). Thus, At(p, k,Kϕ′) = ∩B∈At(p,k,¬ϕ′)At(p, k,K¬B). More-
over, if Mr,e,t1 |= A ⇒ ¬K¬B for some B ∈ At(p, k,¬ϕ′), then M
r,e,t
1 |= A ⇒ ¬Kϕ
′
.
Thus, At(p, k,¬Kϕ′) ⊇ ∪B∈At(p,k,¬ϕ′)At(p, k,¬K¬B). It follows from Lemma A.11(c)
that ∪B∈At(p,k,¬ϕ′)At(p, k,¬K¬B) = ∩B∈At(p,k,¬ϕ′)At(p, k,K¬B) = At(p, k,Kϕ′). Since
At(p, k,¬Kϕ′) and At(p, k,Kϕ′) are clearly disjoint, it follows that
At(p, k,¬Kϕ′) = ∪B∈At(p,k,¬ϕ′)At(p, k,¬K¬B),
and that both At(p, k,Kϕ′) and At(p, k,¬Kϕ′) are effectively computable. Finally, if ϕ =
∀xϕ′, similar arguments using Lemma A.11(d) show thatAt(p, k, ∀xϕ′) = ∩B∈At(p,k−1,¬ϕ′)At(p, k−
1, ∀¬B)(= ∩B∈At(p,k−1,¬ϕ′)At(p, k−1,¬∃xB) andAt(p, k,¬∀xϕ′) = ∪B∈At(p,k−1,¬ϕ′)At(p, k−
1,¬∀¬B). Again, by Lemma A.11(d), these sets are effectively computable.
To complete the proof of Theorem 5.3 for the case C = {r, e, t}, suppose that ϕ ∈
L∀,K1 (Φ,X ). Then there exists some finite p such that ϕ ∈ L
∀,K
1 (p). We claim that ϕ is
valid iff At(p, k, ϕ) = At(p, k). The fact that ϕ is valid if At(p, k, ϕ) = At(p, k) follows
immediately from Lemma A.11(b). For the converse, note that if At(p, k, ϕ) 6= At(p, k), then
by Lemma A.12, At(p, k,¬ϕ) 6= ∅. It is easy to see that each atom in At(p, k) is satisfiable
in some structure in Mr,e,t1 . If M is a structure in M
r,e,t
1 satisfying A ∈ At(p, k,¬ϕ), then
M also satisfies ¬ϕ, showing that ϕ is not valid. Finally, by Lemma A.12, we can effectively
compute At(p, k, ϕ) and check if At(p, k, ϕ) = At(p, k).
Thus, we have dealt with the case that C = {r, e, t}. It is well known [Fagin, Halpern,
Moses, and Vardi 1995, Lemma 3.1.5] and easy to show that a reflexive Euclidean relation is
transitive. Thus, M{r,e,} =M{r,e,t}, so we have also dealt with the case that C = {r, e}.
For the case C = {e, t}, essentially the same proof works. We briefly list the required
modifications:
• We define a formula indist that is true if a world indistinguishable from the current
world (in the sense that the same formulas are true in both worlds) is considered possible.
indist is an abbreviation for:
∃x(describable(x) ∧ ∀y(y ⇔ ¬K¬(x ∧ y))).
Note that indist is guaranteed to hold in a world where the accessibility relation is re-
flexive.
• We modify the definition of (p, k)-atom. We define a (p, k)-atom to to include a conjunct
saying whether indist holds. Thus, we define a (p, k)-atom to have one of the following
forms:
– a ∧ indist ∧ ∧b∈PA(p)cb, where ca 6= E0a; or
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– a ∧ ¬indist ∧ ∧b∈PA(p)cb.
Note that a ∧ ¬indist ∧ E0a is satisfiable in M{e,t}, since the accessibility relation no
longer needs to be reflexive, but a ∧ indist ∧ E0a is not.
• We replace Mr,e,t by Me,t throughout the statement and proof of Lemma A.11.
• In the proof of Lemma A.11(c), we haveMe,t1 |= A⇒ K¬A′ not only in the case that A
and A′ disagree on the 2k-bounded count of some atom in PA(p), but also if ¬indist is
one of the conjuncts of A′. This is true since all structures inMe, and hence inMe,t, the
K relations satisfy secondary reflexivity: if M = (S,K, pi) ∈ Me and (s, t) ∈ K, then it
is easy to check that (t, t) ∈ K. Thus, indist holds at t.
• In the proof of Lemma A.11(d), we modify the definition of x-compatibility. We now
say that B is x-compatible with A if either
(a) indist is a conjunct of bothA andB, and all the previous conditions for x-compatibility
hold; or
(b) ¬indist is a conjunct of both A and B, and all the preivous conditions for x-
compatibilty hold except that we do not require that c+a 6= E0(a ∧ x) or c−a 6=
E0(a ∧ ¬x).
It is easy to show that M{e,t} |= A ⇒ ∃xB if B is x-compatible with A and that
M{e,t} |= A⇒ ¬∃xB if B is not x-compatible with A.
The argument for the case C = {e} is similar to that for C = {e, t}. It depends on the fol-
lowing semantics characterization of satisfiability with respect to structures in Me1, similar in
spirit to corresponding characterizations for Mret1 and Mrst1 (see [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and
Vardi 1995, Proposition 3.1.6]): A formula is satisfiable in Me1 iff there exists some structure
M such that (M, s0) |= ϕ, where M = ({s0} ∪S ∪S ′, pi,K), and (a) S and S ′ are disjoint sets
of states; (b) if S = ∅ then S ′ = ∅, (c) K(s0) = S; (d) K(s) = S ∪ S ′ if s ∈ S ∪ S ′; and (e)
|{s0} ∪ S ∪ S ′| ≤ |ϕ| [Halpern and Reˆgo 2006a].
Given this characterization, it can be seen that for each point atom b we must count not
only the number of describable worlds where b is true that an agent considers possible, but also
the number of describable worlds that an agent considers possible that he considers possible.
Define indistKK ,N-boundedKK-count, CKKk ϕ, andEKKk ϕ by replacing every occurrence of
K by KK in the definitions of indist, N-bounded count, CKϕ, and Ekϕ, respectively. Since
the K relation in structures in Me1 satisfies secondary reflexivity and the Euclidean property, it
is easy to check that Me1 |= indist ⇒ indistKK , Me1 |= E∞ϕ ⇒ ¬EKK0 ϕ, Me1 |= Ekϕ ⇒
CKKk ϕ, and Me1 |= CNϕ⇒ CKKN ϕ.
We now modify the definition of (p, k)-atom to include a description of what is true at
the worlds that an agent considers possible that he considers possible. Thus, we now take a
(p, k)-atom to have the form
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• a ∧ indist ∧ indistKK ∧b∈PA(p) (cb ∧ c
KK
b ),
• a ∧ ¬indist ∧ indistKK ∧b∈PA(p) (cb ∧ c
KK
b ), or
• a ∧ ¬indist ∧ ¬indistKK ∧b∈PA(p) (cb ∧ c
KK
b ),
where (a) cb (resp., cKKb ) is a 2k-bounded count (resp., KK-count) for all b ∈ PA(p), (b)
ca 6= E0a if indist is a conjunct, (c) cKKa 6= EKK0 a if indistKK is a conjunct, (d) if cb = Elb
and l < 2k, then either cKKb = EKKm b and l ≤ m <∞, or cKKb = CKK2k b, (e) if cb = E∞b, then
cKKb 6= E
KK
0 b, and (f) if cb = C2kb, then cKKb = CKK2k b.
The same ideas used to prove Lemma A.11 for the case of C = {r, e, t} can now be used
to prove an analogous result for the case C = {e}; we omit details here. The rest of the proof
is identical to that of the case C = {r, e, t}, replacing every occurrence of Mr,e,t1 by Me1.
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